Combined visual and motor disorganization in patients with schizophrenia

Cognitive impairments are difficult to relate to clinical symptoms in schizophrenia, partly due to insufficient knowledge on how cognitive impairments interact with one another. Here, we devised a new sequential pointing task requiring both visual organization and motor sequencing. Six circles were presented simultaneously on a touch screen around a fixation point. Participants pointed with the finger each circle one after the other, in synchrony with auditory tones. We used an alternating rhythmic 300/600 ms pattern so that participants performed pairs of taps separated by short intervals of 300 ms. Visual organization was manipulated by using line-segments that grouped the circles two by two, yielding three pairs of connected circles, and three pairs of unconnected circles that belonged to different pairs. This led to three experimental conditions. In the “congruent condition,” the pairs of taps had to be executed on circles grouped by connecters. In the “non congruent condition,” they were to be executed on the unconnected circles that belonged to different pairs. In a neutral condition, there were no connecters. Twenty two patients with schizophrenia with mild symptoms and 22 control participants performed a series of 30 taps in each condition. Tap pairs were counted as errors when the produced rhythm was inverted (expected rhythm 600/300 = 2; inversed rhythm <1). Error rates in patients with a high level of clinical disorganization were significantly higher in the non-congruent condition than in the two other conditions, contrary to controls and the remaining patients. The tap-tone asynchrony increased in the presence of connecters in both patient groups, but not in the controls. Patients appeared not to integrate the visual organization during the planning phase of action, leading to a large difficulty during motor execution, especially in those patients revealing difficulties in visual organization. Visual motor tapping tasks may help detect those subgroups of patients

Disruption of information processing in schizophrenia: The time perspective

AbstractWe review studies suggesting time disorders on both automatic and subjective levels in patients with schizophrenia. Patients have difficulty explicitly discriminating between simultaneous and asynchronous events, and ordering events in time. We discuss the relationship between these difficulties and impairments on a more elementary level. We showed that for undetectable stimulus onset asynchronies below 20ms, neither patients nor controls merge events in time, as previously believed. On the contrary, subjects implicitly distinguish between events even when evaluating them to be simultaneous. Furthermore, controls privilege the last stimulus, whereas patients seem to stay stuck on the first stimulus when asynchronies are sub-threshold. Combining previous results shows this to be true for patients even for asynchronies as short as 8ms. Moreover, this peculiarity predicts difficulties with detecting asynchronies longer than 50ms, suggesting an impact on the conscious ability to time events. Difficulties on the subjective level are also correlated with clinical disorganization. The results are interpreted within the framework of predictive coding which can account for an implicit ability to update events. These results complement a range of other results, by suggesting a difficulty with binding information in time as well as space, and by showing that information processing lacks continuity and stability in patients. The time perspective may help bridge the gap between cognitive impairments and clinical symptoms, by showing how the innermost structure of thought and experience is disrupted

RCEA: Real-time, Continuous Emotion Annotation for collecting precise mobile video ground truth labels

Collecting accurate and precise emotion ground truth labels for mobile video watching is essential for ensuring meaningful predictions. However, video-based emotion annotation techniques either rely on post-stimulus discrete self-reports, or allow real-time, continuous emotion annotations (RCEA) only for desktop settings. Following a user-centric approach, we designed an RCEA technique for mobile video watching, and validated its usability and reliability in a controlled, indoor (N=12) and later outdoor (N=20) study. Drawing on physiological measures, interaction logs, and subjective workload reports, we show that (1) RCEA is perceived to be usable for annotating emotions while mobile video watching, without increasing users' mental workload (2) the resulting time-variant annotations are comparable with intended emotion attributes of the video stimuli (classification error for valence: 8.3%; arousal: 25%). We contribute a validated annotation technique and associated annotation fusion method, that is suitable for collecting fine-grained emotion annotations while users watch mobile videos

Individual Differences in Reward Sensitivity Modulate the Distinctive Effects of Conscious and Unconscious Rewards on Executive Performance

Executive control can be driven by conscious and unconscious monetary cues. This has raised the exciting question regarding the role of conscious and unconscious reward in the regulation of executive control. Similarities and differences have been uncovered between unconscious and conscious processing of monetary rewards. In the present study, we explored whether individual differences associated with reward sensitivity foster these variations on memory-updating—a core component process of executive control. Participants (N = 60) with low, medium, and high reward sensitivity were selected and performed a numerical memory-updating task. At the beginning of each trial, a high (1 euro) or a low (5 cents) reward was presented subliminally (24 ms) or supraliminally (300 ms). Participants earned the reward by responding correctly. Participants with low reward sensitivity performed better for the high reward only in the subliminal condition. For participants with medium reward sensitivity, performance improved with high reward in both subliminal and supraliminal conditions. When participants had high reward sensitivity scores, the effect of reward was stronger in the supraliminal condition than the subliminal condition. These results show that the distinctive effects of conscious and unconscious rewards on executive performance are modulated by individual differences in reward sensitivity. We discuss this finding with reference to models of conscious/unconscious processing of reward stimuli

The interactive effect of achievement motivation and task difficulty on mental effort

International audienc

Influence of positive subliminal and supraliminal affective cues on goal pursuit in schizophrenia

Goal pursuit is known to be impaired in schizophrenia, but nothing much is known in these patients about unconscious affective processes underlying goal pursuit. Evidence suggests that in healthy individuals positive subliminal cues are taken as a signal that goal pursuit is easy and therefore reduce the effort that is mobilized for goal attainment. Patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls were instructed that a long run of successive correct responses in a visual attention task would entitle them to a reward (the goal to attain). Affective pictures were displayed supraliminally or subliminally during each run and electrophysiological activity was recorded. Patients self-assessed the emotional content of the pictures correctly. However, differences between patients and controls emerged during the goal pursuit task. Healthy controls mobilized less effort for the positive than the neutral subliminal pictures, as suggested by increased error rates and the weaker contingent negative variation (CNV). For the patients, no influence of positive subliminal pictures was found on performance and on the CNV. Similarly the influence of positive pictures was absent or abnormal on components which are usually impaired in patients (fronto-central P2 and N2). In contrast, positive pictures influenced normally the parieto-occipital N2, related to a component of visual attention which has been proposed to be preserved in schizophrenia. The present study indicates the difficulties of patients to modulate effort mobilization during goal pursuit in the presence of positive subliminal cues. The results question the role of cognitive deficits on affective influences

Patients with schizophrenia do not preserve automatic grouping when mentally re-grouping figures: shedding light on an ignored difficulty

Looking at a pair of objects is easy when automatic grouping mechanisms bind these objects together, but visual exploration can also be more flexible. It is possible to mentally ‘re-group’ two objects that are not only separate but belong to different pairs of objects. ‘Re-grouping’ is in conflict with automatic grouping, since it entails a separation of each item from the set it belongs to. This ability appears to be impaired in patients with schizophrenia. Here we check if this impairment is selective, which would suggest a dissociation between grouping and ‘re-grouping’, or if it impacts on usual, automatic grouping, which would call for a better understanding of the interactions between automatic grouping and ‘re-grouping’. Sixteen outpatients with schizophrenia and healthy controls had to identify two identical and contiguous target figures within a display of circles and squares alternating around a fixation point. Eye-tracking was used to check central fixation. The target pair could be located in the same or separate hemifields. Identical figures were grouped by a connector (grouped automatically) or not (to be re-grouped). Attention modulation of automatic grouping was tested by manipulating the proportion of connected and unconnected targets, thus prompting subjects to focalize on either connected or unconnected pairs. Both groups were sensitive to automatic grouping in most conditions, but patients were unusually slowed down for connected targets while focalizing on unconnected pairs. In addition, this unusual effect occurred only when target were presented within the same hemifield. Patients and controls differed on this asymmetry between within- and across-hemifield presentation, suggesting that patients with schizophrenia do not re-group figures in the same way as controls do. We discuss possible implications on how ‘re-grouping’ ties in with ongoing, automatic perception in healthy volunteers